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In this paper we revisit medium- to long-run exchange rate determination, focusing on the 
role of international investment positions. To do so, we develop a new econometric 
framework accounting for conditional long-run homogeneity in heterogeneous dynamic panel 
data models. In particular, in our model the long-run relationship between effective exchange 
rates and domestic as well as weighted foreign prices is a homogeneous function of a 
country’s international investment position. We find rather strong support for purchasing 
power parity in environments of limited negative net foreign asset to GDP positions, but not 
outside such environments. We thus argue that the purchasing power parity hypothesis holds 
conditionally, but not unconditionally, and that international investment positions are an 
essential component to characterizing this conditionality. Finally, we adduce evidence that 
whether deterioration of a country’s net foreign asset to GDP position leads to a depreciation 
of that country’s effective exchange rate depends on its rate of inflation relative to the rate of 
inflation abroad as well as its exposure to global shocks. 
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Research on exchange rate dynamics constitutes a continued cornerstone of applied economic
investigations. A sizeable fraction of these investigations have aimed at understanding the
driving forces of medium- to long-run exchange rate dynamics. Nevertheless, little consensus
has been reached. In particular, in the quest to characterize medium- to long-run anchors
for the ﬂuctuations of exchange rates, the purchasing power parity (PPP) hypothesis has
received support by some studies, yet has been rejected by others. While these diﬀerences
in empirical ﬁndings may in part be attributed to choice of econometric methodology, the
diﬀerences have also emerged due to diﬀerent currency pairs and/or diﬀerent time periods
being considered.
For research in this area to move forward, it thus appears essential to view the PPP hypothe-
sis as (at most) conditionally valid and to pay close consideration to the interaction between
exchange rate ﬂuctuations on the one hand and the macroeconomic as well as ﬁnancial envi-
ronment within which the pricing of currencies occurs on the other hand. Arguably, one of
the most striking changes in this environment over the last few decades has been the growth
of cross-country capital ﬂows and the cumulative international investment positions they
imply. As argued for example by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005), “ﬁnancial globalization
[has been] one of the key trends that has reshaped the global economy”.
In this paper, we study the interaction between medium- to long-run exchange rate dynamics
and international investment positions in equity, foreign direct investment and debt. We
analyze to what extent the PPP hypothesis may be viewed as an anchor for the pricing of a
currency over medium- to long-run horizons if conditioned on the international investment
position of the country issuing the currency.
Previous work on the PPP hypothesis (for example, Taylor, Peel and Sarno, 2001, and
Binder, Pesaran and Sharma, 2004) has argued that mean reversion of real exchange rates
only occurs under suﬃciently large imbalances and/or arbitrage opportunities for foreign
exchange market participants. Here, we relate these bands of real exchange rate reversion to
a country’s international investment position: We conjecture that if foreign exchange mar-
ket participants perceive this investment position to be suﬃciently imbalanced to require
correction, they expect a return to macroeconomic fundamentals that includes correction of
the exchange rate towards a plausible anchor, possibly the level of the exchange rate pre-
dicted by PPP. Such a correction may help to adjust the international investment position
both through current account and valuation eﬀects and in any case may signal the markets’
expectation of a reversion towards medium- to long-run fundamentals. We also conjecture
that under very severe imbalances in a country’s international investment position foreign
exchange market participants may lose conﬁdence in the relevance of macroeconomic funda-
1mentals for the pricing of the country’s currency, and therefore again, as in the absence of
suﬃciently large imbalances, will pay little – if any – attention to PPP.
We test these hypotheses in this paper and more generally provide a characterization of the
role of international investment positions for medium- to long-run exchange rate dynamics
using a panel of 71 countries over the time period 1970 to 2004. We propose and implement a
new dynamic panel data model for our analysis. Our panel model has a variety of appealing
features: In line with existing state of the art cross-country panel models in the literature,
our model explicitly distinguishes between short- and long-run dynamics, does not impose
untenable exogeneity restrictions, is valid in the presence of unit roots in the series being
considered, and allows for heterogeneous short-run dynamics of these series across countries.
It moves beyond the models presently available in the literature by introducing conditional
homogeneity across countries in the long-run relation between the series. We model the
conditional long-run homogeneity both parametrically using ﬂexible functional form polyno-
mials (resulting in what we call the conditional pooled mean group (CPMG) panel model)
and non-parametrically using local kernels (resulting in what we call the state kernel mean
group (SKMG) panel model). This econometric framework is applicable – and perhaps ap-
pealing – for a wide range of panel data sets with suﬃciently large time dimension for which
traditional pooling restrictions are not tenable.
Our main empirical results are as follows: We ﬁnd rather strong support for the PPP hy-
pothesis in environments of limited negative international investment positions as measured
by the net foreign asset (NFA) to GDP ratio. In such environments the coeﬃcients in the
long-run relation between eﬀective nominal exchange rates, domestic prices and weighted
foreign prices are (economically) close to their predicted values under PPP. Furthermore,
the speed of adjustment towards the long-run relation is, in light of the estimates typically
obtained in the previous literature, surprisingly fast, at less than two years half-life of shocks
to the PPP relation. We also document that in environments of large negative, zero or
positive NFA to GDP positions the PPP hypothesis does not provide a relevant medium- to
long-run anchor for the pricing of currencies. Our robustness analysis ﬁnds that qualitatively
our results are unlikely to be driven by features of the macroeconomic and ﬁnancial envi-
ronment other than the international investment position of a country. We document that
there is no sensitivity of the range of NFA to GDP positions for which the PPP hypothesis
applies to a country’s exchange rate regime. While the range of NFA to GDP positions for
which the PPP hypothesis applies does feature some sensitivity to a country’s income level
and degree of price variability, even when taking into account these features of a country’s
macroeconomic environment, the conditioning of PPP on a country’s international invest-
ment position remains important. We ﬁnally adduce evidence that how deterioration of a
country’s NFA to GDP position aﬀects changes in that country’s eﬀective exchange rate
2depends on its rate of inﬂation relative to the rate of inﬂation abroad as well as its exposure
to global shocks.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we discuss the relation of our work to
previous literature, both that on medium- to long-run exchange rate dynamics and that on
cross-country panel models. Section 3 develops the CPMG and SKMG panel models. We
outline the main features of our newly assembled database on international capital ﬂows
and international investment positions in Section 4 of the paper. Our empirical ﬁndings are
presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes and discusses directions for future research.
Five appendices provide details on the assembly of our database and on various aspects of
the implementation of the CPMG and SKMG models.
2 Relation to the Literature
2.1 Exchange Rate Dynamics
While there is an enormous body of literature investigating the validity of the purchasing
power parity hypothesis,1 rather limited attention has been paid to investigating the in-
teraction between exchange rate ﬂuctuations and the macroeconomic as well as ﬁnancial
environment within which the pricing of currencies occurs. Two of the exceptions are Tay-
lor, Peel and Sarno (2001) and Binder, Pesaran and Sharma (2004). The former proposed a
nonlinear model for medium- to long-run real exchange rate dynamics, capturing that mean
reversion of real exchange rates would only occur if these deviated suﬃciently strongly from
the PPP anchor.2 The latter – using dynamic panel models subject to simple sample splits –
argued that the empirical validity of the PPP hypothesis is linked to the volatility of domes-
tic prices, and that below a minimum threshold of price volatility arbitrage opportunities
would be too small for PPP to hold.
Neither of these two papers considered the link between exchange rate determination and a
country’s international investment position. A theoretical basis for this link was established
by Cavallo and Ghironi (2002) who build on the model by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995) and
make the case for a dependence of exchange rates on net foreign assets both under a model
with ﬂexible and with sticky prices. Important papers investigating this link empirically
include Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) and Cheung, Chinn and Pascual (2005). Both of
these papers consider a linear regression speciﬁcation with the real exchange rate as the de-
pendent variable and a measure of the NFA position as one of the regressors. Our approach
1For a recent review of the PPP literature see, for example, Taylor and Taylor (2004). Engel, Mark and
West (2007) discuss state of the art exchange rate modelling beyond the PPP literature also.
2Baum, Barkoulas and Caglayan (2001) argue in a similar way in a model separating between nominal
exchange rates and domestic as well as foreign prices.
3will not be to add the NFA position as an additional regressor, implying unconditional rejec-
tion of the PPP hypothesis if this regressor is signiﬁcant and unconditional support for the
PPP hypothesis if this regressor is insigniﬁcant, but to allow for the possibility that PPP is
conditionally valid for certain NFA positions. We think that our dynamic model with condi-
tionally homogeneous long-run relations is a more informative means to characterize the link
between a country’s international investment position and its medium- to long-run exchange
rate dynamics than the default linear regression approach of tacking on the international
investment position as an additional regressor – for the reasons that our model allows for
bands of real exchange rate reversion (as well as lack thereof), is able to characterize the eco-
nomic determinants of these bands and does not impose a monotonic relationship between
changes in a country’s international investment position and its exchange rate adjustment.
2.2 Panel Data and Varying Parameter Models
Key to the understanding of the recent econometric literature on cross-country dynamic panel
data models is the result by Pesaran and Smith (1995) that if a model’s slope coeﬃcients
vary across countries, whether randomly or systematically, then the means of the coeﬃcients
cannot be estimated consistently using a model imposing cross-country homogeneity of the
slope coeﬃcients (and only allowing for structural heterogeneity in the form of random or
ﬁxed eﬀects). To obtain consistent estimators of the means of the slope coeﬃcients, Pesaran
and Smith (1995) proposed the mean group (MG) estimator based on the idea of averaging
the estimates obtained from country-speciﬁc time-series regressions. This MG estimator has
the drawback of not allowing for the eﬃciency gains that are feasible when some economic
features are common across countries. While short-run dynamics beyond some common
shocks are rather unlikely to share common features across a broad range of countries,
common features often are likely to be present in long-run relationships. This insight is
exploited by the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator of Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999),
which imposes homogeneity of the slope coeﬃcients entering the long-run relationships, but
allows for unrestricted heterogeneity of the coeﬃcients characterizing the short-run dynamics.
The dynamic panel model we propose in this paper addresses situations where the homogene-
ity of the slope coeﬃcients entering the long-run relationships does not hold unconditionally,
but rather is tied to certain features of the macroeconomic and ﬁnancial environment. In
such settings, the PMG estimator would yield inconsistent estimates of the long-run slope
coeﬃcients, while the MG estimator would still suﬀer from lack of eﬃciency. We will pursue
two approaches to modelling the dependence of the long-run slope coeﬃcients on features of
the macroeconomic and ﬁnancial environment. Our ﬁrst approach is parametric, modelling
the state dependence using ﬂexible functional form polynomials. Our second approach in-
volves modelling the state dependence via non-parametric kernel methods. The statistical
4literature on non-parametric varying parameter models in static regression settings on which
our modelling approach builds is quite extensive, see for example Fan and Zhang (1999). Ku-
mar and Ullah (2000) have employed a related non-parametric approach in the context of a
univariate dynamic panel model studying convergence of cross-country output growth.
3 Econometric Methodology
3.1 The Mean Group and Pooled Mean Group Panel Models
We begin by reviewing the dynamic panel models, mean group (MG) and pooled mean group
(PMG), on which our proposed new model does build. Let us consider the following panel
version of an autoregressive distributed lag, ARDL(p,q), model:








ikxi,t−k + uit, (1)
where i = 1,2,...,N indexes countries, t = 1,2,...,Ti indexes time periods, yit denotes
the dependent variable (with coeﬃcients ρik on its lagged values), ωi represents the country-
speciﬁc intercept term (ﬁxed eﬀect), and xit and ̺ik represent (m×1) vectors of explanatory
variables and coeﬃcients, respectively.3 We assume that min
i
(Ti) is suﬃciently large so that
the ARDL model in (1) can be estimated for each country separately.
To allow for cross-sectional correlation of the error terms, we specify uit as:
uit = λ
′
ift + εit, (2)
such that the source of error term dependencies across countries is captured by the common
factors ft, whereas the impacts of these factors on each country are governed by the idiosyn-
cratic loadings in λi. The error component εit is assumed to be distributed independently
across i and t with zero mean and variance σ2
i > 0. Although the common factors in ft are
modelled as unobservable, we can control for these by augmenting the ARDL model (1) with
cross-sectional averages of the model’s observable variables following the correlated eﬀects
augmentation of Pesaran (2006): Averaging (1) across i under the assumption that slope
coeﬃcients and regressors are uncorrelated, one obtains
¯ yt = ¯ ω +
p  
k=1





k¯ xt−k + ¯ λ
′ft + ¯ εt, (3)
3For simplicity of notation, we denote the lag orders by p and q, respectively, although in our empirical
implementation we will allow for these to diﬀer across variables and countries, that is, work with the model
speciﬁcation









5where ¯ yt−k = N−1  N
i=1 yi,t−k, ¯ ρk = N−1  N
i=1 ρik, k = 0,1,...,p; ¯ ω = N−1  N
i=1 ωi; ¯ xt−k =
N−1  N
i=1 xi,t−k, ¯ ̺k = N−1  N
i=1 ̺ik, k = 0,1,...,q; ¯ λ = N−1  N
i=1 λi and ¯ εt = N−1  N
i=1 εit.
Since the error component εit by assumption is independently distributed across i and t, ¯ εt
tends to zero in root mean square error as N becomes large. The cross-sectional correlation
in uit can therefore be captured through a linear combination of the cross-sectional averages
of the dependent variable and of all regressors:
λ
′
ift = ϑi¯ λ










ik∆¯ xt−k − ϑi¯ ω, (4)
with reparameterizations ηi = ϑi(1 −
 p
k=1 ¯ ρk), ζi = ϑi(
 q
k=0 ¯ ̺k), νik = ϑi(
 p
ℓ=k+1 ¯ ρℓ) and
ςik = ϑi(
 q
ℓ=k+1 ¯ ̺ℓ), for some ϑi. Using Equation (4), the error-correction representation of
the panel ARDL model (1) and (2) can be written as:





















ik∆¯ xt−k + εit, (5)




k=0̺ik, φik = −
 p
ℓ=k+1ρiℓ and δik =
−
 q









i  i − α
−1
i (ηi¯ yt + ζ
′




i ( i + χ
′
igt), (6)
where gt = (¯ yt ¯ x′
t)′ represents the level parts of the common factors and χi = (ηi ζ
′
i)′
contains the loadings on these common factors.
The long-run coeﬃcients between yi and xi, given by θi, and the speed of adjustment
towards the long-run relation for country i, given by αi, constitute the key coeﬃcients of
economic interest in the panel ARDL model (5). In what follows, we will therefore also work
with a transformed version of the model in (5) that only keeps the coeﬃcients in (αi θ
′
i), and
extracts all other coeﬃcients using their (country-speciﬁc) least-squares estimators. Deﬁning
the country-speciﬁc long-run deviation, ξit, as follows:
ξit(θi) = yi,t−1 − θ
′
ixit, (7)
upon multiplying Equation (5) with an idempotent matrix Mi, where






with ITi denoting the identity matrix of dimension Ti and Hi capturing the extracted re-
gressors,
Hi = (hi1 hi2 ... hiTi)
′, (9)
6with
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we obtain the transformed model
Mi∆yi = αi(Miyi,−1 − MiXiθi) + εi = αiMiξi(θi) + εi, (10)
where for each country we have stacked all variables across time periods, such that
∆yi = (∆yi1 ∆yi2 ... ∆yiTi)
′,
yi,−1 = (yi0 yi1 ... yi,Ti−1)
′,
Xi = (xi1 xi2 ... xiTi)
′,
ξi(θi) = [ξi1(θi) ξi2(θi) ... ξiTi(θi)]
′,
and
εi = (εi1 εi2 ... εiTi)
′.
The Pesaran and Smith (1995) MG estimators of αi and θi are obtained by least-squares
estimation of (10) for each country separately and subsequently averaging the country-
speciﬁc coeﬃcient estimates. Standard errors for these MG estimates can be computed
non-parametrically on the basis of the spread of the coeﬃcients across countries.
The idea underlying the Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) PMG estimation is to assume
that the long-run coeﬃcients θi are homogeneous across all countries (that is, θi = θ, i =
1,2,...,N), but that all other coeﬃcients are still allowed to diﬀer in unrestricted fashion
across countries. The PMG estimator is based on numerical maximization of the implied
restricted likelihood function.
3.2 Conditioning the Pooled Mean Group Approach: The CPMG
Model
The PMG estimator exhibits considerable appeal for the study of exchange rate dynamics:
It is rather unlikely that the short-run dynamics of nominal exchange rates and domestic as
well as foreign prices exhibit strong commonalities across countries – it thus appears to be
a very sensible choice to let such short-run dynamics diﬀer in unconstrained fashion across
countries, as the PMG estimator does do. At the same time, the PPP hypothesis imposes
a common restriction across countries on the long-run coeﬃcients, that the PMG estimator
does incorporate.
7As we have argued in the Introduction, though, it seems unlikely that PPP would hold even
in the long run across all countries and their diﬀering macroeconomic and ﬁnancial environ-
ments. To capture the interaction between medium- to long-run exchange rate dynamics
on the one hand and a country’s international investment position on the other hand, we
propose to condition the coeﬃcients in the long-run relation between nominal exchange rates
and domestic as well as foreign prices on a predetermined state variable measuring a coun-
try’s international investment position. To map this idea back to the generic panel ARDL
model (5), denoting the value of the conditioning predetermined state variable by ˜ zit,4 we
therefore propose the following augmented model:

















′∆¯ xt−k + εit, (11)
where, in analogy to (6), we have
αi(˜ zit)yi,t−1 + βi(˜ zit)
′xit = αi(˜ zit)[yi,t−1 − θ(˜ zit)
′xit]. (12)
Note that all short-run coeﬃcients in (11) are a function of both ˜ zit as well as other country-
speciﬁc characteristics (reﬂected in the i subscripts for all coeﬃcient functionals), but that
the long-run coeﬃcients in (12) are speciﬁed across all countries as a homogeneous function
of ˜ zit: θi(˜ zit) = θ(˜ zit), i = 1,2,...,N.
We propose to specify θ(˜ zit) using a parametric function of ﬂexible form, and in particular







s   cs(˜ zit), (13)
with the Chebyshev polynomials cs(˜ zit) recursively deﬁned as
cs+1(˜ zit) = 2˜ zitcs(˜ zit) − cs−1(˜ zit), s = 1,2,...,τ,
c0(˜ zit) = 1 and c1(˜ zit) = ˜ zit, and where γ
(θ)
s is an m-dimensional vector of coeﬃcients that
is homogeneous across countries. The coeﬃcient functionals αi(˜ zit), φik(˜ zit) etc. can be
speciﬁed in similar form (albeit with country-speciﬁc rather than homogeneous coeﬃcients).
One approach to the estimation of the CPMG model is to concentrate the likelihood function,
writing it as a function of αi(˜ zit) and θ(˜ zit) (the coeﬃcient functions of economic interest)
4In this paper, we specify ˜ zit to be a scalar. The extension to considering a vector of state variables is
beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research.
5We work with orthogonal polynomials in part as an eﬀective means to avoid multicollinearity problems.
8only, and subsequently maximize this concentrated likelihood function. A computationally
less burdensome alternative that we focus on in this paper is to adapt the two-step estimation
strategy proposed by Breitung (2005) for the PMG model to our CPMG model: Rewriting
(11) as
∆yit = yi,t−1αi(˜ zit) + x
′
itβi(˜ zit) + h
′
itψi(˜ zit) + εit, i = 1,2,...,N, t = 1,2,...,Ti, (14)
where
ψi(˜ zit) = [ i(˜ zit) φi1(˜ zit) φi2(˜ zit) ... φi,p−1(˜ zit) δi0(˜ zit)
′ δi1(˜ zit)
′ ... δi,q−1(˜ zit)
′
ηi(˜ zit) ζi(˜ zit)
′ νi0(˜ zit) νi1(˜ zit) ... νi,p−1(˜ zit) ςi0(˜ zit)
′ ςi1(˜ zit)
′ ... ςi,q−1(˜ zit)
′]
′,
ψi(˜ zit) denoting the (state-dependent) coeﬃcient vector on the variables that are neither
relevant for country i’s long-run relationship nor its speed of adjustment, in the ﬁrst step
we estimate the coeﬃcients in (14) (including σ2
i and estimating βi(˜ zit) rather than θ(˜ zit),
so that all estimated coeﬃcients are country-speciﬁc) from
∆yi = Yi,−1(˜ zi)γ
(αi)
i + X i(˜ zi)γ
(βi)
i + Hi(˜ zi)γ
(ψi)
i + εi, (15)
where Yi,−1(˜ zi), X i(˜ zi) and Hi(˜ zi) are combinations of yi,−1, Xi and Hi, respectively, with






i are the polynomial coeﬃcients. For
a detailed description of the matrices of coeﬃcients and variables involved see Appendix A.
This ﬁrst step can be accomplished using country-speciﬁc least squares. In a second step,
estimate the conditionally homogeneous long-run coeﬃcients through pooled least-squares
estimation of a transformed model concentrating out all country-speciﬁc coeﬃcients, namely,
vi = −X i(˜ zi)γ
(θ) + ǫi, (16)
where
vi = ˆ Ai(˜ zi)
−1
 
























s   cs(˜ zit)),
ǫi = ˆ Ai(˜ zi)
−1εi,
and




with Ai(˜ zi) = diag[αi(˜ zi1),αi(˜ zi2),...,αi(˜ ziT)]. Equation (16) is derived in Appendix A.
9In practice, to keep the model structure parsimonious one may wish to restrict the orders
of most polynomials in (11) (except for those in yi,t−1 and xit) to zero. Note that such a
restriction is completely consistent with the idea of unrestricted cross-country heterogene-
ity of the model’s short-run dynamics. Due to the heterogeneous nature of the functional
relationship between αi and the conditioning variable ˜ zit that still remains under such a
restriction, we should be explicit about how we propose to compute a panel estimate of the
speed of adjustment coeﬃcient for each value of the conditioning state variable, ˜ zit. For each
˜ zit we compute the average across all functionals αj(˜ zit), j = 1,2,...,N, incorporating in the
averaging procedure a weighting with respect to the local environment for which each αj(˜ zit)
has been estimated. The details of the procedure we use to compute a smoothed mean group
estimate of the speed of adjustment coeﬃcient and its corresponding standard error are laid
out in Appendix B.
3.3 Non-Parametric Conditioning: The SKMG Model
The CPMG model carefully separates the form of the eﬀect of changes in the condition-
ing state variable ˜ zit on speed of adjustment/short-run coeﬃcients (through country-speciﬁc
conditioning functions) from those on the long-run coeﬃcients (through pooled conditioning
functions). An alternative conditioning procedure would be to make the form of the condi-
tioning dependent on the speciﬁc value that the conditioning state variable assumes; that is,
to construct conditioning functions that do not diﬀer across short- vs. long-run coeﬃcients,
but for both types of coeﬃcients give priority to “neighboring” values of the conditioning
state variable, and assign more distant values of the conditioning state variable a relatively
minor role in shaping the conditioning functions. To pursue this latter idea, our SKMG
model introduces a non-parametric kernel for the panel ARDL model (1). Building on the
work of Kumar and Ullah (2000), we weight all available observations using a kernel function
and minimize a modiﬁed residual sum of squares, namely








it κ(˜ zit − ˜ zjs), j = 1,2,...,N, s = 1,2,...,Ti, (17)
where ℘(˜ zjs) = [α(˜ zjs) β(˜ zjs)′ ψ(˜ zjs)′]
′ comprises the local values of the coeﬃcients in Equa-
tion (14) and κ(˜ zit − ˜ zjs) represents the kernel that eﬀectively gives higher weight to obser-
vations “close” to ˜ zjs and lower weight to observations “far” from this point.
Adhering as for the CPMG model to the principle of parsimony and only incorporating
kernels for the coeﬃcients on yi,t−1 and xit, the concentrated version of our panel ARDL





i,−1α(˜ zjs) + X
∗
iβ(˜ zjs) + εi, j = 1,2,...,N, s = 1,2,...,Ti. (18)
10with ∆y∗
i = Mi∆yi, y∗
i,−1 = Miyi,−1, and X
∗
i = MiXi. Taking account of heteroskedastic
variances σ2
i, Equation (17) can be solved using the Local Least Squares Kernel (LLSK)
estimator,






∗, j = 1,2,...,N, s = 1,2,...,Ti, (19)
where








−1(˜ zjs) = Ω
−1/2K(˜ zjs)Ω
−1/2,
























K(˜ zjs) is a diagonal matrix containing the values of κ(˜ zit − ˜ zjs); for its actual shape see Ap-








and can be estimated using OLS estimates of σ2
i for each country. The variance of the
parameter estimates can be obtained as
















To allow for richer patterns of coeﬃcient variation across values of the conditioning state
variable than obtained by the LLSK estimator, for our SKMG model we incorporate poly-
nomials of higher order into the conditioning procedure as employed in static regression
settings by Fan and Zhang (1999). To incorporate the polynomials in the computation of
the local coeﬃcients, we again make use of Chebyshev polynomials. We therefore modify
the regressors in (19) as follows:
˜ W(˜ zjs) = [ ˜ w11(˜ zjs) ˜ w12(˜ zjs) ... ˜ wNT(˜ zjs)]
′, (21)
where
˜ wit(˜ zjs) = [ ˜ w
′
1,it(˜ zjs) ˜ w
′







ℓ,it(˜ zjs) = wℓ,it [c0(˜ zit − ˜ zjs) c1(˜ zit − ˜ zjs) c2(˜ zit − ˜ zjs) ... cτ(˜ zit − ˜ zjs)]
= wℓ,it π
′
τ(˜ zit − ˜ zjs), ℓ = 1,2,...,m + 1. (23)
Note that wℓ,it refers to observation (i,t) for the ℓ-th variable in W. We denote the estimator
that results from the right-hand side of (19), but with W replaced by ˜ W, as ˆ ˜ ϕℓ(˜ zjs). This
estimator can in turn be used to construct interpolated estimates of ϕ(˜ zjs), ˆ ˘ ϕ(˜ zjs), as









t=1 κ(˜ zjs − ˜ zit)
, ℓ = 1,2,...,m + 1, (24)
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t=1 κ(˜ zjs − ˜ zit)
, ℓ = 1,2,...,m+1.
(25)
We call the resultant estimator the SKMG estimator.
Contrasting the ideas underlying the CPMG and SKMG modelling approaches, the para-
metric CPMG is the more parsimonious of the two approaches. However, it also tends to
be the less robust of the two approaches, as the curvatures of the conditioning functions can
be more heavily inﬂuenced by outlying values of the conditioning variable. All modelling
approaches, MG, PMG, CPMG and SKMG, require the existence of a long-run relation
between yit and xit which has to be tested for prior to the application of the estimation
procedures. Appendix D reviews the panel cointegration test of Westerlund (2005), which
we will employ in the empirical part of our paper, and its applicability both for models with
unconditional and conditional long-run relations.
4 International Capital Flow and Investment Position
Data
We have assembled a new database for this paper featuring data on international capital ﬂows
and the implied international investment positions of countries. Our database comprises
these data on an annual basis for a total of 153 countries over the time period 1970 to 2004.
We obtained most of the ﬂow data from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Balance of
Payments Statistics (BOPS); stock data were taken from the IMF’s International Investment
Position (IIP) database as well as the World Bank’s Global Development Finance (GDF)
database. All international capital data we used were compiled in millions of U.S. Dollars.
In addition to international capital ﬂows and stocks, our database incorporates data on gross
domestic product (GDP) from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database,6
bilateral nominal exchange rates and consumer prices from the IFS, as well as exports and
imports which are taken from the Direction of Trade Statistics also maintained by the IMF.
The key diﬃculty in the compilation of our database was that the IIP for most countries
only contains a small number of observations. It was therefore essential to augment the IIP
stock data by cumulating ﬂow data. For this cumulation the stock data have to be initialized
with an existing stock ﬁgure for some reference period. For the overall investment position
of a country, the NFA position, possibly the best source of such a ﬁgure is Sinn (1990) who
provides NFA estimates for up to 145 countries over the period 1970 to 1987. For the sub-
components of NFA we used stock data from the IIP database for purposes of initialization.
6Some of the GDP data in this database are reported in domestic currency values; we converted such
GDP data to U.S. Dollar ﬁgures using yearly average bilateral exchange rates.
12Given that the ﬂow data may have an earlier starting point than the stock data, occasionally
we needed to backcast the initial stock value. In eﬀect, our cumulative ﬂow ﬁgures are thus
anchored by the ﬁrst available stock ﬁgure from IIP data. We did not compute cumulative
ﬂow ﬁgures if they did not overlap with corresponding stock data.
Changes in the stock of any asset or liability are not only due to new ﬂows, but can also be due
to changes in the value of the existing stock. The sources of valuation changes diﬀer across
types of ﬁnancial assets and liabilities. In particular, we adjusted portfolio equity investment
liabilities using domestic stock market indices adjusted for exchange rate changes (obtained
from Datastream that in turn draws upon Morgan Stanley and other sources) and portfolio
equity investment assets using a world stock market index (MSCI World Index from Morgan
Stanley). Furthermore, we adjusted foreign direct investment (FDI) liabilities using bilateral
real exchange rates relative to the United States, and FDI assets using eﬀective real exchange
rates.7 Changes in the value of external debt are already incorporated in the stock values
reported in the GDF database, and changes in the value of international reserve assets were
obtained from the diﬀerence between ﬂows and the change in the corresponding stock value.
See Appendix E for further details. Denoting net valuation changes aggregated across all
asset and liability types as ∆NV , we ﬁnally obtained the stock of NFA as
NFAit = NFAi,t−1 + CAit + KAit + ∆NVit, (26)
where CAit denotes country i’s current account balance at time t and KAit refers to its
capital account balance.8
Since we completed compilation of our database, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) have aug-
mented the international capital ﬂow and investment position database described in Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2001); the new version of the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti database now has
similar cross-country and time coverage as our database. In contrast to Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2006), our database also separately reports the valuation eﬀects. For more details
on the construction of our database, see Oﬀermanns and Pramor (2006).
7 Throughout this paper we use eﬀective exchange rates computed using trade weights. Denoting by
eijt the nominal spot exchange rate between country i and country j (units of country i currency per
unit of country j currency), measured as annual averages, we compute the eﬀective exchange rate as eit =  N
j=1 ˜ wijteijt. The weights ˜ wijt are computed as predetermined moving averages of country i’s trade volume
with country j as a share of country i’s overall trade volume, that is ˜ wijt = 1/r  
 t−1
s=t−r wijs with wijt =
(EXPijt + IMPijt)/(
 N
k=1 EXPikt + IMPikt), where EXPijt and IMPijt denote country i’s exports to
and imports from country j in U.S. Dollars, and the window width is chosen as r = 3. While a mixture
of trade and capital weights might be most appealing, we have to restrict our attention to trade weights,
as information on bilateral ﬂows of capital that would be needed to compute informative capital weights at
present is not available for (even a substantial sub-sample of) the broad cross section of countries we wish
to examine.
8According to the deﬁnitions laid out in the ﬁfth edition of the Balance of Payments Manual (BOPM),
the sum of the current account balance and the capital account balance oﬀset what is called the ﬁnancial
account balance. Some of the literature still refers to what the BOPM labels as the capital account balance
as “net capital transfers” (within the current account), reserving the term “capital account balance” for the
change in NFA that we are aiming at.
13While our overall database contains annual observations on a total of 153 countries, for the
empirical analysis of this paper we restrict attention to 71 countries only. These countries
were selected from the 153 countries in our database on the basis of the following criteria:
(i) at least 25 consecutive time-series observations available for all variables entering our
analysis;
(ii) population size of at least one million in 1970;9
(iii) economy not centrally planned for (most of) the sample period (according to the clas-
siﬁcation used by Hall and Jones, 1999);
(iv) economy not a major oil producer (according to the classiﬁcation used by Mankiw,
Romer and Weil, 1992).
The resultant 71 countries included in our analysis are: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Aus-
tria, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Mo-
rocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, El Salvador, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic,
Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.
The international investment position data for this set of countries exhibit a highly pro-
nounced increase in the magnitude of gross asset and liability stocks as a ratio to GDP over
our sample period. This fact reﬂects the global trend of increasing international ﬁnancial
integration over the last couple of decades that has led to a massive build-up of interna-
tional gross capital positions. A breakdown of these positions, deﬁned as the sum of gross
asset and liability stocks as a ratio to GDP, shows that among the three major categories
of international capital positions, namely foreign direct investment (FDI), equity and debt,
FDI positions have risen between 1970 and 2004 by 360%, equity positions by 880% and
debt positions by 440%, amounting to an overall increase (including that of oﬃcial reserves)
by 450% (see Figure 1). However, it is not only gross international capital positions that
have increased in such astonishing fashion. The process of international ﬁnancial integration
also has had an impact on countries’ net international investment positions, resulting in a
marked increase of imbalances in net international capital positions. As one measure, the
cross-country dispersion of the NFA to GDP ratio has increased by 84% over our sample
period (see Figure 2). As we wish to examine to what extent imbalances in a country’s inter-
national investment position induce corrections towards PPP as a foreign exchange market
anchor, in what follows we will focus on net, not gross, international investment positions.10
9The population data were taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, complemented
by data from the Penn World Tables.
10Our ﬁgure conﬁrms the well-documented “world NFA discrepancy” (see, for example, Lane and Milesi-
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5.1 Model Speciﬁcation
To facilitate discussion of our empirical results, let us adapt the generic notation used in
Section 3 for our panel ARDL model to the exchange rate model that we take to the data.
Based on our general panel ARDL model (5) we specify:
∆eit =  i+αi(˜ zit)
































ςik(∆¯ pt−k − ∆¯ p
∗
t−k) + εit, (27)
where eit denotes the logarithm of country i’s eﬀective nominal spot exchange rate, pit the
logarithm of country i’s consumer price index and p∗
it the logarithm of weighted foreign con-
sumer price indices (using the same weighting scheme as for the eﬀective exchange rate).11
Note that the PPP hypothesis does not pin down a unique choice of dependent and inde-
pendent variables for the ARDL model. We specify the eﬀective nominal exchange rate as
the dependent variable, as our primary interest is in how the nominal and real exchange
rates adjust to changes of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial fundamentals. Our choice of the de-
pendent variable does not imply that we are assuming domestic and weighted foreign prices
to be (strictly) exogenous, however. In the context of ARDL models endogeneity of an in-
dependent variable can be overcome by adding suﬃciently many lags of that independent
variable.12 To account for the presence of global shocks, following our discussion in Section 3
we augment the model by incorporating cross-sectional averages of the observable variables,
denoted by ¯ et, ¯ pt and ¯ p∗
t, respectively.
The parameters of principal interest are those that have immediate structural interpretation,
namely the long-run coeﬃcients θi(˜ zit) and the speed of adjustment parameter αi(˜ zit). Note
that (unconditional) PPP implies that θ1i = 1 and θ2i = −1 with αi < 0. By conditioning
these coeﬃcients on ˜ zit, we render these dependent on the country’s international investment
position, speciﬁcally on a moving average of the NFA to GDP ratio over the preceding ten
Ferretti, 2006) with a ratio of aggregate NFA to aggregate GDP that averages at −0.058 over our sample
period. For the full data set of 153 countries in our database, the ratio of aggregate NFA to aggregate GDP
averages at −0.048 over our sample period.
11As is well known, the use of aggregate price indices implies that the long-run relationship, even if
consistent with the PPP hypothesis, can only be interpreted as providing evidence for relative (but not
absolute) PPP.
12For a more detailed discussion of this issue in the time-series setting see Pesaran and Shin (1999).
15years in the sample. This speciﬁcation of ˜ zit ensures that it can be treated as weakly
exogenous for estimation purposes.13 Also, by using ten-year averages we aim to cleanse the
NFA to GDP ratio of short-run volatility, and eﬀectively condition on the past medium- to
long-run trend of a country’s international investment position. We considered a number of
other speciﬁcations of ˜ zit as well, including cumulative current account balances and changes
in asset and liability valuation (all scaled by GDP). Employing the NFA to GDP ratio as
the conditioning variable proved to be most eﬀective.
For MG estimation of our model, we specify αi(˜ zit) = αi and θi(˜ zit) = θi. For PMG
estimation, we specify αi(˜ zit) = αi and θi(˜ zit) = θ. For CPMG estimation, we specify
θi(˜ zit) = θ(˜ zit), with αi(˜ zit) and θ(˜ zit) modelled as ﬁrst- and third-order Chebyshev poly-
nomials, respectively. For SKMG estimation, we use a Gaussian kernel combined with
homogeneous coeﬃcient ﬁrst-order Chebyshev polynomials to model the state dependence
of αi and θi. Lag orders are selected on the basis of both the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) and the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC).
5.2 Empirical Results
5.2.1 Testing the Model Speciﬁcation
We begin by examining the stationarity properties of the various variables entering our
exchange rate model (27). For this model to be well speciﬁed, the model variables should be
either integrated of order zero or one, I(0) or I(1), and the long-run levels relation between
the model variables should be I(0). To test for the order of integration of nominal eﬀective
exchange rates, e, domestic prices, p, and weighted foreign prices, p∗, we employ the panel
unit root test of Pesaran (2007).14 The results in Table 1(a) provide strong evidence that
p and p∗ are I(1) variables. Somewhat surprisingly, the evidence in favor of e to be I(1) is
less compelling. However, as the unit root test statistic for the level of e was insigniﬁcant at
the one percent level when the cross-sectional augmentation term was dropped, we proceed
with the consensus view in the literature that e is best modelled as I(1). We invoke the test
statistic proposed by Westerlund (2005) to test for (conditional) panel cointegration between
e, p and p∗, that is, the existence of an I(0) relation between e, p and p∗ depending on our
conditioning variable ˜ z; Appendix D provides details on the test statistic and its applicability
for our panel modelling approach. Table 1(b) provides evidence that e − θ1(˜ z)p − θ2(˜ z)p∗ is
I(0). The results in Table 1(b) are based on a third-order Chebyshev polynomial speciﬁcation
13For the beginning of the sample, however, to avoid losing numerous observations the moving average is
computed using a ﬁxed window involving the observations in the ﬁrst ten years of the sample, that is, we
compute ˜ zit = 1/10 
 max(t−1,10)
s=max(t−10,1) zis, t = 1,2,...,Ti.
14This panel unit root test inter alia allows for two features of the data that we stress in this paper:
country-speciﬁc short-run dynamics and cross-country correlation of the error terms.
16of θ(˜ z), but also hold when the polynomial order is reduced to zero or one. Overall, Table
1 provides strong support for the exchange rate model (27) being an appropriate model
formulation concerning (non-)stationarity of the model variables.
5.2.2 Estimation Results for the Full Sample
We can thus turn to estimation results for the exchange rate model (27). Table 2 reports the
long-run coeﬃcients on p and p∗ in the long-run relation between eﬀective nominal exchange
rates, domestic prices and weighted foreign prices, as well as the speed of adjustment to
this long-run relation under the diﬀerent estimation procedures we consider. The ﬁrst two
columns report MG and PMG estimation results, whereas the third and fourth columns
show the average estimates across all values of the conditioning variable, the NFA to GDP
ratio, obtained under CPMG and SKMG. In contrast to the MG estimates that do not
involve any form of pooling, the estimates of both long-run parameters based on all other
estimation procedures are highly signiﬁcant. It may be worth pointing out explicitly that the
standard errors under CPMG and even under SKMG are smaller yet than those under PMG,
providing some support for the CPMG and SKMG procedures we are proposing in this paper
to be eﬀective procedures for the number of observations available in many cross-country
macroeconomic panels.15 Note that at least from a statistical perspective unconditional
PPP, that is θ1 = 1 and θ2 = −1 across all values of the NFA to GDP ratio, is clearly
rejected under the PMG, CPMG and SKMG procedures. All point estimates of the long-
run parameters for θ1 fall in the interval [0.55,0.74], and those for θ2 fall into the interval
[−0.88,−0.68] and suggest a stronger long-run reaction of eﬀective nominal exchange rates
to weighted foreign prices as compared to domestic prices. It is quite remarkable that the
estimates of the speed of adjustment coeﬃcients all suggest rather fast adjustment to the
long-run relation, in particular implying half lives between one and two years, much faster
than what has typically been found in the literature and removing most of the stickiness
puzzle that the previous literature on PPP (see, for example, Rogoﬀ, 1996) argued to be
present.
While the average parameter estimates for CPMG and SKMG across all values of the NFA
to GDP ratio are qualitatively similar to those obtained under the PMG approach, the idea
underlying our CPMG and SKMG approaches is, of course, to report on the variation of
the speed of adjustment and long-run coeﬃcients across diﬀerent values of the NFA to GDP
ratio. Figures 3 to 18 pick up on this point. Figures 3 and 5 convey that for our full sample
of 71 countries there appears to be a strong dependence of the two long-run coeﬃcients
for domestic and weighted foreign prices on a country’s international investment position
15While a systematic investigation of the ﬁnite sample properties of the CPMG and SKMG estimators
proposed in this paper will be valuable, this is beyond the scope of the current paper.
17as reﬂected by the NFA to GDP ratio. In particular, in environments of limited negative
NFA to GDP ratios we ﬁnd rather strong evidence that foreign exchange markets appear
to view the PPP relation as a strong anchor for the pricing of currencies. Under a limited
negative NFA to GDP ratio, the long-run coeﬃcients on domestic and weighted foreign prices
are economically and partially even statistically insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from one and minus
one, respectively. The boundaries of this limited negative NFA to GDP ratio are rather
similar under the CPMG and SKMG procedures: about minus two thirds to minus one
third under the CPMG approach, and about minus three quarters to minus one third under
the SKMG approach. For other states of the international investment position, the long-run
relation bears limited, little or even no resemblance with what PPP would suggest. When
the NFA to GDP ratio is smaller than minus one, the SKMG approach suggests long-run
elasticities of the eﬀective nominal exchange rate with respect to domestic and weighted
foreign prices of less than one half in absolute value. The elasticities do not drop as strongly
under the CPMG approach; however, the CPMG standard error bands widen sizeably for
NFA to GDP ratios of less than minus one and a half, reﬂecting the very limited number
of such values in our sample. It thus appears that under negative NFA to GDP ratios that
suggest a high degree of external imbalance, foreign exchange markets abandon PPP as a
medium- to long-run anchor. PPP also appears to have limited to no importance when the
NFA to GDP ratio is approaching zero and even when there is a limited positive NFA to
GDP ratio. The latter result may, however, also reﬂect too few observations in our sample
for which the NFA to GDP ratio exceeds plus one ﬁfth.
Figures 4 and 6 report on the speed of adjustment coeﬃcients for our full sample under
the CPMG and SKMG approaches. Under the SKMG approach the speed of adjustment
coeﬃcients vary very little with the NFA to GDP ratio. While Figure 4 suggests that under
the CPMG approach the speed of adjustment coeﬃcients vary considerably more across NFA
to GDP ratios than under the SKMG approach, such variation occurs primarily outside the
interval from minus one to zero: For NFA to GDP ratios less than minus one, the speed
of adjustment coeﬃcient increases rapidly, whereas it tends towards zero for NFA to GDP
ratios larger than plus one ﬁfth. Once more, however, it appears prudent not to put strong
emphasis on results obtained for values of the NFA to GDP ratio larger than plus one ﬁfth,
given the limited number of observations in our sample involving such NFA to GDP ratios.
Overall, Figures 3 to 6 provide rather strong evidence that the NFA to GDP ratio signiﬁcantly
inﬂuences medium- to long-run exchange rate dynamics, but has limited, if any, eﬀect on
short-run dynamics. Medium- to long-run exchange rate dynamics under limited negative
NFA to GDP ratios seem well characterized by PPP.
185.2.3 Robustness Analysis Using Sample Splits
In addition to the international investment position of a country, it is likely that its medium-
to long-run exchange rate dynamics are also inﬂuenced by other features of its macroeco-
nomic and ﬁnancial environment such as its income level, its exchange rate regime or its
degree of price variability.16 One reason that the income level may matter is that if a coun-
try’s NFA to GDP ratio was on average negatively related to its income level (and we will
document evidence for this to be the case), then it would seem reasonable to conjecture
that the threshold as to when a negative NFA to GDP ratio is judged by foreign exchange
market participants to indicate imbalance depends in absolute value negatively on the level
of income. Depending on the exchange rate regime, imbalances of real exchange rates may
be judged to be more or less sustainable, resulting in diﬀering degrees of conformity of the
exchange rate with price fundamentals. Regarding price variability, a relatively high degree
of price variability will ceteris paribus lead to a larger number of situations where imbalances
will be suﬃciently pronounced to require correction and thus might result in PPP equilibrium
being a more relevant description of medium- to long-run exchange rate dynamics.
As a ﬁrst analysis to what extent our results regarding the role of a country’s international
investment position for medium- to long-run exchange rate dynamics are sensitive to also
modelling other factors of the macroeconomic and ﬁnancial environment, we therefore in-
clude income level, exchange rate regime and price variability information in our analysis to
disentangle the impact of these factors from that of the international investment position. It
would clearly be appealing to allow for multi-factor conditioning through a CPMG or SKMG
model that conditioned on a vector of state variables. However, in the setup of our panel
model of Section 3 this could easily result in a loss of parameter parsimony. How to best
reconcile parsimony with the CPMG and SKMG approaches is left for future research. In
this paper, we instead conﬁne ourselves to documenting the variation of the long-run elas-
ticity of the eﬀective nominal exchange rate with respect to domestic and weighted foreign
prices across diﬀering NFA to GDP ratios for three sample splits: (i) industrial and emerg-
ing market countries vs. developing countries, (ii) sticky exchange rate regimes vs. ﬂoating
exchange rate regimes and (iii) countries with a relatively high degree of price variability vs.
countries with a relatively low degree of price variability.
Beginning with the income level based split, we split our sample of 71 countries into three
groups, following the World Bank’s income-based classiﬁcation of countries.17 In particular,
we label countries categorized by the World Bank as “high-income OECD countries” as
16Previous literature on the PPP hypothesis has argued that the stationarity properties of real exchange
rates may depend on such factors (see, for example, Cheung and Lai, 2000, or Binder, Pesaran and Sharma,
2004).
17See http://go.worldbank.org/D7SN0B8YU0, accessed on April 26, 2006.
19“industrial countries”, label the World Bank’s “high-income non-OECD countries” as well as
“upper middle-income countries” as “emerging markets” and ﬁnally label the World Bank’s
“lower middle-income countries” as well as “low-income countries” as “developing countries”.
We ﬁnd that for this sample split the average NFA to GDP ratio is equal to −0.175 for
the industrial and emerging market countries, and is equal to −0.576 for the developing
countries. Figures 7 to 10 suggest that the relation between medium- to long-run exchange
rate pricing and a country’s international investment position that we found for the full
sample of countries is also present both for our industrial and emerging market countries
sample as well as our developing countries sample, with some quantitative qualiﬁcations.
For the industrial and emerging market countries sample the range of limited negative NFA
to GDP ratios for which we observe PPP-type medium- to long-run relations is associated
with smaller investment position imbalances than for the sample comprising all countries,
extending now over an interval from about minus one half to minus one tenth. Furthermore,
both under CPMG and SKMG the absolute values of the long-run elasticities of the eﬀective
nominal exchange rate with respect to domestic and weighted foreign prices fall relative to
their PPP values by rather small amounts only for values of the NFA to GDP ratio that are
less than minus one half. At least under the CPMG approach these elasticities fall a good
bit more strongly for zero and positive values of the NFA to GDP ratio. Overall, it appears
that – as we had conjectured – foreign exchange markets for industrial and emerging market
countries view PPP as a relevant anchor for smaller (negative) imbalances of the international
investment position than for developing countries. For the latter, the range of NFA to GDP
ratios under which we observe PPP-type medium- and long-run relations appears to be both
under CPMG and SKMG about minus two thirds to minus one third.
To consider the role of exchange rate regimes for our results, we employ a data set on the de
facto classiﬁcation of exchange rate ﬂexibility assembled by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2005). Their data set contains an annual ﬁve-way categorization of the exchange rate
regimes of inter alia all the 71 countries considered in our analysis as “ﬂexible”, “dirty
ﬂoat”, “inconclusive”, “crawling peg” and “ﬁxed”. We recode these ﬁve categories from a
value of one for a “ﬂexible” exchange rate regime to a value of ﬁve for a “ﬁxed” exchange
rate regime.18 Our sample split then constructs two groups of countries: The ﬁrst group
consists of countries for which the exchange rate classiﬁcation code over our sample period
is on average at most equal to three, and the second group features all countries with an
exchange rate classiﬁcation code being on average larger than three over our sample period.
Figures 11 to 14 report on our exchange rate regime based sample splits. Inspection of
these ﬁgures reveals that the curvatures of the functions depicting the long-run coeﬃcients
in dependence of the NFA to GDP ratio actually diﬀer more sizeably across the CPMG
18The Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) data set spans the period 1974 to 2004; we assume that all
exchange rates were “ﬁxed” over the period 1970 to 1973.
20and SKMG estimation approaches than across the two sub-samples of sticky and ﬂoating
exchange rate regimes. This suggests that our international investment position conditioning
is separate from any inﬂuence of exchange rate regimes on medium- to long-run exchange rate
dynamics. Figures 11 to 14 indeed suggest the even stronger interpretation that exchange
rate regimes matter little for medium- to long-run pricing in foreign exchange markets, at
least for the sample of countries we are considering.19
To consider the impact of a country’s degree of price variability on our results, we split our
sample into one group of countries for which the average rate of inﬂation over our sample
period exceeded eight percent (we label countries in this group as those exhibiting a “high
degree of price variability”) as well as a second group of countries for which the average
rate of inﬂation over our sample period was eight percent or lower (we label countries in
this group as those exhibiting a “low degree of price variability”). Figures 15 to 18 report
on our sample split between countries with a high degree of price variability (relatively
high rates of inﬂation) vs. countries with a low degree of price variability (relatively low
rates of inﬂation). The ﬁgures suggest that the magnitudes of international investment
position imbalances under which foreign exchange markets in the medium to long run price
currencies in line with PPP are sensitive to the degree of price variability. The CPMG
estimates in particular convey that limited negative NFA to GDP ratios for countries with
a high degree of price variability are centered around minus two thirds to minus one half,
but for countries with a low degree of price variability are in absolute value sizeably larger,
namely are centered around minus one approximately. In other words, under relatively high
degrees of price stability, foreign exchange markets return to PPP fundamentals only under
higher degrees of external imbalance than in environments of relatively low degrees of price
stability. This is consistent with the intuition that arbitrage opportunities tend to be more
likely present in environments of low degrees of price stability.20
19It should be kept in mind, of course, that we work with eﬀective exchange rates spanning a broad
range of countries, whereas the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) classiﬁcation concerns ﬂuctuations of
a currency relative to one selected currency (often the U.S. Dollar, the Pound Sterling, the Deutsche Mark
or the French Franc) only.
20The rank correlation coeﬃcient between our income level based sample split and the price variability
based sample split (coding for the income level based sample split an industrial/emerging market country
as 1 and a developing country as 2; and for the price variability based sample split a low price variability
country as 1 and a high price variability country as 2) is 0.317. A developing country is more likely to also
be a high price variability country. As for a developing country the range of NFA to GDP ratios that we
categorize as limited negative is in absolute values larger than for an industrial/emerging market country,
but for a country with high degree of price variability the range of NFA to GDP ratios that we categorize
as limited negative is in absolute values smaller than for countries with a low degree of price variability, the
results for income level and price variability based sample splits are indeed distinct results.
215.2.4 Exchange Rate Projections: The Eﬀects of Changes in the NFA to GDP
Position on Nominal and Real Exchange Rates
Finally, let us turn to discussing the potential implications of our in-sample estimation results
for out-of-sample exchange rate developments. In particular, we wish to examine how under
diﬀerent scenarios for a country’s international investment position as measured by the NFA
to GDP ratio its nominal and real exchange rates would evolve. Under a plausible scenario
regarding the rate of growth of domestic and weighted foreign prices, will a reversion to PPP-
based exchange rate pricing per se help with removing the imbalance in the international
investment position by implying a real depreciation of the domestic currency? If so, what
will be the magnitude of this depreciation?
To compute our out-of-sample projections, we start from the long-run relation between
nominal exchange rates, domestic prices and weighted foreign prices that is implied by our
model (27), is conditional on the state of the NFA to GDP ratio, and is aﬀected also by the
long-run impact of the common factors:
e
LR
it = ˆ θ1(˜ zi)pit + ˆ θ2(˜ zi)p
∗
it − [ˆ αi(˜ zi)]
−1[ˆ  i + ˆ ηi¯ et + ˆ ζi(¯ pt − ¯ p
∗
t)]
= ˆ θ1(˜ zi)pit + ˆ θ2(˜ zi)p
∗
it − [ˆ αi(˜ zi)]
−1[ˆ  i + ˆ χ
′
igt]. (28)
For purposes of our projections we use the relative PPP interpretation of (28) in terms of
changes of the variables involved:
∆e
LR
it = ˆ θ1(˜ zi)∆pit + ˆ θ2(˜ zi)∆p
∗
it − [ˆ αi(˜ zi)]
−1[ˆ ηi∆¯ et + ˆ ζi∆(¯ pt − ¯ p
∗
t)]
= ˆ θ1(˜ zi)∆pit + ˆ θ2(˜ zi)∆p
∗




To obtain the ten-year, out-of-sample projections of nominal and real eﬀective exchange





i,2004+s) = ˆ θ1(˜ z
(k)










iProj2004(∆g2004+s), s = 1,2,...,10, k = 0,1,2, (30)
where all counterfactual projections (k = 0,1,2) postulate that domestic prices, weighted
foreign prices and common factors change over the projection period at a rate that equals



















[Proj2004(g2004+s−1) − Proj2004(g2004+s−11)], (33)
22with Proj2004(pi,2004+τ) = pi,2004+τ, Proj2004(p∗
i,2004+τ) = p∗
i,2004+τ and Proj2004(g2004+τ) =
g2004+τ for τ ≤ 0.
The projections diﬀer with respect to the assumption about the international investment
position. For the baseline projection, Proj
(0)
2004, we assume that the NFA to GDP position
throughout the projection period remains at its 2004 smoothed level, that is, we assume
˜ z
(0)
i = ˜ zi,2004. (34)
For the second projection, Proj
(1)
2004, we assume that throughout the projection period the
NFA to GDP ratio is equal to a level obtained from adding to the 2004 level of the smoothed
NFA to GDP ratio the total change of the smoothed NFA to GDP ratio that would have
resulted had the smoothed NFA to GDP ratio grown for ten years at a rate equal to its rate
of change over the previous ﬁve-year time period, that is, we compute
˜ z
(1)







[Proj2004(˜ zi,2004+s−1) − Proj2004(˜ zi,2004+s−6)], (36)
with Proj2004(˜ zi,2004+τ) = ˜ zi,2004+τ for τ ≤ 0.




i = ˜ zi,2004 + 2   Proj2004(∆˜ zi), (37)
with Proj2004(∆˜ zi) given by (36). That is, for the third projection we postulate for each
country double the change of the NFA to GDP ratio that we postulated for our second
projection.
Figures 19 to 27 report on these projections for nine currencies in our sample, three each
from the industrial, emerging market and developing countries sub-samples: the U.S. Dollar,
the British Pound Sterling, the Spanish Peseta, the Mexican Peso, the Turkish Lira, the
Uruguayan Peso, the Indian Rupee, the Paraguayan Guarani and the Thai Baht. The
currencies were selected to illustrate settings for which we can compare exchange rate change
trajectories involving NFA to GDP positions that vary within or close to the range of what
we had called limited negative NFA to GDP positions.
In each of the Figures 19 to 27, the table in sub-panel (a) summarizes the eﬀects of the
three alternative projection states of the NFA to GDP ratio on the parameters of interest,
namely the long-run coeﬃcient on domestic prices, θ1, the long-run coeﬃcient on weighted
foreign prices, θ2, and the speed of adjustment coeﬃcient, α. Sub-panels (b) and (c) depict
the actual (left to the 2004 vertical line) and projected (right to the 2004 vertical line)
23values of domestic and weighted foreign prices as well as the common factor eﬀects, ˆ χ
′
igt.
Sub-panels (d) and (e) show the projections of the resultant changes in eﬀective nominal
and real exchange rates, conditional on the three alternative projection states of the NFA to
GDP ratio. Here, the (+)-symbol (blue) line represents the baseline projection keeping the
NFA to GDP ratio at its 2004 smoothed level throughout the projection period (that is, the
projection in (30) under k = 0). For the United States, for example, this projection reveals
that due to (i) a higher weighted rate of inﬂation abroad than domestically, also taking
into account in absolute value larger long-run elasticities of exchange rates with respect to
weighted foreign than domestic prices, and (ii) the common factor eﬀect we project the
U.S. Dollar to appreciate throughout the projection period (with some levelling oﬀ of the
magnitude of the appreciation in the second half of the projection period). The (×)-symbol
(red) lines in Figures 19(d) and (e) depict the projection in (30) under k = 1, and the
(◦)-symbol (green) lines in Figures 19(d) and (e) depict the projection in (30) under k = 2,
that is, these are the projections for which for the United States the NFA to GDP ratio
throughout the projection period is assumed to be −0.48 (for k = 1) and −0.69 (for k = 2)
rather than −0.28 as under the baseline projection (k = 0). We can see that under NFA to
GDP ratios of −0.48 and −0.69 the long-run coeﬃcients on domestic and weighted foreign
prices are closer to plus/minus one, reﬂecting shift of the NFA to GDP ratio to what for the
full country sample we had categorized as a limited negative value. The absolute changes
in the two long-run coeﬃcients, θ1 and θ2, are quite similar in magnitude, both as we move
from k = 0 to k = 1 and as we move from k = 1 to k = 2. It should also be noted that for
the United States, the speed of adjustment coeﬃcient shows more variation with changes in
the NFA to GDP position than what occurs for our full sample; the half-life of shocks to the
long-run relation is around eight months at an NFA to GDP ratio of −0.48 and around four
months at an NFA to GDP ratio of −0.69.
As inspection of Equation (30) reveals, the overall depreciating exchange rate eﬀects of a
deterioration of the NFA to GDP ratio for the United States are thus due to the appreciation
inducing common factor eﬀect having less impact on the long-run relation due to faster speed
of adjustment to the medium- to long-run relation (in light of higher rates of inﬂation abroad
than domestically, the isolated eﬀect of moving closer to PPP pricing for the United States
in contrast is a slight appreciation). Table 3 lists the exchange rate eﬀects. For the United
States, an NFA to GDP position of −0.48 rather than −0.28 under the projected price and
common factor eﬀect changes would imply that the overall appreciation of the U.S. Dollar
eﬀective exchange rate would be 0.4% smaller over the ﬁrst year of the projection period,
and 2.46% smaller when cumulated over the entire ten year projection period. These eﬀects
increase to 0.55% and 3.32%, respectively, when the NFA to GDP position is equal to −0.69
rather than −0.28. We thus ﬁnd that a growing deﬁcit in the international investment
24position of the United States ceteris paribus leads in nominal and real terms to a (small)
depreciation of the U.S. Dollar.21
Figures 19 to 27 show that for seven out of the nine countries considered in our projections,
the NFA to GDP position under the k = 1 and k = 2 projections reﬂects a larger deﬁcit in
the international investment position than under k = 0. Deterioration of the NFA to GDP
position in our projections beyond the United States applies to the United Kingdom, Spain,
Mexico, Turkey, Uruguay and Paraguay. Our projections involve improvements of the NFA
to GDP position for India and Thailand.
Of the seven countries for which our projections feature a decreasing NFA to GDP position,
the deterioration for ﬁve countries (beyond the United States, these are Mexico, Turkey,
Uruguay and Paraguay), ceteris paribus has a depreciating eﬀect on the eﬀective nominal
and real exchange rates. The eﬀects are particularly pronounced for the Turkish Lira and
the Uruguayan Peso, in real terms under a decrease of the NFA to GDP ratio from −0.22
to −0.35 for Turkey amounting to 27.85% when cumulated over ten years, and to 22.54%
cumulated over the ten year horizon under a decrease of the NFA to GDP ratio from −0.23
to −0.6 for Uruguay. (Table 4 puts all eﬀects in relation to the size and direction of change of
the NFA to GDP position.) For Turkey, this result reﬂects that as the long-run coeﬃcients θ1
and θ2 under the decrease of the NFA to GDP ratio move closer to their PPP values of plus
one and minus one, this in net terms causes a sizeable depreciating eﬀect due to domestic
inﬂation being signiﬁcantly higher than inﬂation abroad. For Uruguay, the depreciating
exchange rate eﬀect of a deteriorating NFA to GDP position reﬂects both the diminution
of the appreciation inducing common factor eﬀect (due to faster reversal to the long-run
relation) and the fact that higher inﬂation domestically than abroad has a strengthened
depreciating eﬀect when exchange rate pricing is more closely in line with PPP. In contrast,
for two countries, the United Kingdom and Spain, our projection results indicate a very
small appreciating eﬀect that ceteris paribus is set oﬀ by a worsening of the NFA to GDP
position. This is due to the fact that there is no notable depreciating eﬀect from the common
factor eﬀect for these two countries, and that exchange rate pricing more closely in line with
PPP due to slightly higher inﬂation abroad than domestically has a small appreciating eﬀect
on the Pound Sterling and the Spanish Peseta.
For the two countries for which our projections involve improvements of the NFA to GDP
position, India and Thailand, the projections indicate a relative appreciation of the Indian
Rupee and a relative depreciation of the Thai Baht. For the Rupee, this occurs as exchange
rate pricing less closely in line with PPP implies less weight for domestic inﬂation (that
for India is projected to be higher than inﬂation abroad). In the case of the Baht, despite
21Note, of course, that our projections do not model the feedback from exchange rate depreciation onto
the current account and onto the international investment position.
25improvement of the NFA to GDP position under our projections, the Baht is projected
to depreciate as the depreciation inducing common factor eﬀect gains more weight due
to the higher persistence of deviations from the long-run relation under a more balanced
international investment position.
Overall, the results reﬂect that our conditioning of the interrelation between nominal ex-
change rates, domestic prices and weighted foreign prices on the NFA to GDP position im-
plies that the eﬀect of a change in the NFA to GDP position on the exchange rate depends
on the rate of inﬂation. In particular, considering environments in which deterioration of a
country’s NFA to GDP position leads to an increased relevance of PPP based exchange rate
pricing, the depreciating eﬀect of this deterioration depends on the magnitude of domestic
inﬂation relative to the magnitude of inﬂation abroad: If inﬂation is higher domestically than
abroad, then for all countries we have studied a deterioration of the NFA to GDP position
per se caused exchange rate depreciation. If inﬂation is higher abroad than domestically,
however, then for all countries we have studied the direction of change of the exchange rate
implied by a deterioration of the NFA to GDP position critically depended on the degree to
which the common factor eﬀect would, due to changes in the persistence of deviations from
the long-run relation, matter more or matter less.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have revisited medium- to long-run exchange rate determination, focusing on
the role of international investment positions. To do so, we have developed a new econometric
framework accounting for conditional long-run homogeneity in heterogeneous dynamic panel
data models. In particular, in our model the long-run relationship between exchange rates
and domestic as well as weighted foreign prices has been speciﬁed as a function of a country’s
international investment position as measured by smoothed lagged values of the NFA to GDP
position. We have found rather strong support for PPP in environments of limited negative
net foreign asset to GDP positions, but not outside such environments. We also added
evidence that the conditioning of PPP on a country’s international investment position
remains important when allowing for other features of the macroeconomic environment,
such as the income level, the exchange rate regime and the degree of price variability. Using
counterfactual projections, we investigated the implications of these results for the relation
between changes in a country’s NFA to GDP position and its eﬀective nominal and real
exchange rate. We found that this relation varies widely across countries, depending on
inﬂation dynamics and exposure to global shocks. A deterioration of a country’s NFA to
GDP position tends to have the largest depreciating exchange rate eﬀects (both nominal and
real) when domestic inﬂation signiﬁcantly exceeds inﬂation abroad.
26Our future research will in particular address two issues: (i) the extension of CPMG and
SKMG models to a parsimonious multivariate conditioning framework, and (ii) the extension
of at least part of our database to bilateral measurement of international capital ﬂows,
allowing to address issues of links between the sources and destinations of capital ﬂows as
well as their eﬀects on stocks of international investment positions on the one hand and
macroeconomic and ﬁnancial market outcomes on the other hand.
27Tables and Figures
Table 1: Stationarity Properties for 71 Countries, 1970 to 2004





(b) Panel Cointegration Test
V RP
e − θ1(˜ z)p − θ2(˜ z)p∗ −4.9449
Notes: The panel unit-root test (part (a)) is computed according to Pesaran (2007) and has a non-standard
distribution under the null hypothesis of a unit root in the time series under consideration for all countries.
Under the alternative hypothesis, the variable is I(0) for a non-vanishing share of countries. Levels of the
variables are modelled with a constant and a linear time trend, whereas the speciﬁcations for ﬁrst diﬀerences
of the variables include a constant only. The critical value at the 5% (1%) signiﬁcance level for the level of
a variable is −2.58 (−2.69) and −2.08 (−2.19) for the ﬁrst diﬀerence of a variable. The panel cointegration
test statistic (part (b)) is distributed standard Normal under the null of no cointegration. V RP refers to the
Panel Variance Ratio Statistic in Westerlund (2005), which has the alternative hypothesis that cointegration
prevails for all countries. The test statistic was computed using Chebyshev polynomials of order three for
the estimation of conditionally homogeneous long-run coeﬃcients. The lag orders in both parts of the table
were selected according to the Akaike Information Criterion based on a maximum lag length of 2, but the
results are robust to other choices, as well as to lag selection on the basis of other information criteria such
as the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion. Figures in bold face denote signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
Table 2: Speed of Adjustment and Long-Run Coeﬃcients (Averages)

























Notes: Cross-country averages of the speed of adjustment coeﬃcient α and the long-run coeﬃcients on the
domestic (θ1) and weighted foreign (θ2) prices. PPP would suggest that α < 0, θ1 = 1, and θ2 = −1. Under
CPMG and SKMG, country-speciﬁc coeﬃcients are evaluated at the mean of the conditioning variable ˜ zit.
The lag length is selected according to Akaike Information Criterion with a maximum lag of 2. Standard
errors are given in parentheses below the coeﬃcients; ﬁgures in bold face denote signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
28Table 3: Cumulated Eﬀect of Changes in the International Investment Position
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
1 5 10 1 5 10
U.S. Dollar 0.40 1.28 2.46 0.55 1.71 3.32
Pound Sterling −0.05 −0.21 −0.39 −0.10 −0.42 −0.77
Spanish Peseta 0.00 −0.47 −0.87 0.01 −0.98 −1.84
Mexican Peso 0.38 1.14 1.73 0.73 2.21 3.37
Turkish Lira 1.53 7.80 14.33 2.99 15.16 27.85
Uruguayan Peso 2.84 7.20 13.45 4.64 12.05 22.54
Indian Rupee −0.01 −0.54 −1.01 −0.04 −1.08 −2.01
Paraguayan Guarani 0.16 1.75 3.21 0.13 2.41 4.37
Thai Baht 0.29 0.83 1.56 0.64 1.80 3.37
Notes: Sum of diﬀerences between exchange rate changes in percentage points after one, ﬁve and ten years. Scenario 1:
Comparison between projections based on ˜ z
(1)
i relative to projections based on ˜ z
(0)
i . Scenario 2: Comparison between projections
based on ˜ z
(2)
i relative to projections based on ˜ z
(0)
i . See Section 5.2.4 for further details.
Table 4: Cumulated Relative Eﬀect of Changes in the International Investment Position
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
1 5 10 1 5 10
U.S. Dollar −1.94 −6.21 −11.95 −1.34 −4.17 −8.08
Pound Sterling 0.34 1.45 2.67 0.33 1.43 2.65
Spanish Peseta −0.01 6.27 11.64 −0.05 6.60 12.30
Mexican Peso −3.81 −11.29 −17.08 −3.63 −10.93 −16.69
Turkish Lira −23.59 −120.2 −220.8 −23.01 −116.8 −214.5
Uruguayan Peso −15.15 −38.38 −71.69 −12.36 −32.11 −60.06
Indian Rupee −0.28 −13.17 −24.59 −0.45 −13.09 −24.37
Paraguayan Guarani −0.56 −6.23 −11.40 −0.23 −4.28 −7.75
Thai Baht 9.08 25.68 48.01 9.81 27.73 51.83
Notes: Sum of diﬀerences between exchange rate changes in percentage points after one, ﬁve and ten years relative to the size
and direction of the change in the NFA to GDP position. Scenarios 1 and 2 are deﬁned as in Table 3.
29Figure 1: Gross Asset and Liability Stocks as a Ratio to GDP, 1970 to 2004












Notes: All positions are aggregates of absolute values of assets and liabilities divided by aggregate GDP across our sample of
71 countries.
Figure 2: Net Foreign Assets as a Ratio to GDP, 1970 to 2004










Notes: The solid line represents the aggregate of NFA divided by aggregate GDP across our sample of 71 countries, with the
standard deviation across countries of the NFA to GDP ratio represented by the boundaries of the shaded area.
30Figure 3: Long-Run Coeﬃcients for 71 Countries, 1970 to 2004: CPMG Approach













Notes: Estimates of the conditional long-run coeﬃcients between the eﬀective nominal exchange rate and domestic as well as
weighted foreign prices in the panel ARDL model (27) using Chebyshev polynomials of order three in the conditioning variable,
the latter deﬁned as a 10-year predetermined moving average of the NFA to GDP ratio. The lag length is selected according to
the Akaike Information Criterion with a maximum lag of 2. Standard error bands denote the 95% conﬁdence intervals of the
coeﬃcient estimates.
Figure 4: Adjustment Coeﬃcients for 71 Countries, 1970 to 2004: CPMG Approach
















Notes: Smoothed mean group estimates of the adjustment coeﬃcients in the panel ARDL model (27) using Chebyshev poly-
nomials of order one in the conditioning variable, the latter deﬁned as a 10-year predetermined moving average of the NFA to
GDP ratio. The lag length is selected according to the Akaike Information Criterion with a maximum lag of 2. Standard error
bands denote the 95% conﬁdence intervals of the coeﬃcient estimates.
31Figure 5: Long-Run Coeﬃcients for 71 Countries, 1970 to 2004: SKMG Approach













Notes: Estimates of the conditional long-run coeﬃcients between the eﬀective nominal exchange rate and domestic as well as
weighted foreign prices in the panel ARDL model (27) using local kernels in the conditioning variable, the latter deﬁned as a
10-year predetermined moving average of the NFA to GDP ratio. The lag length is selected according to the Akaike Information
Criterion with a maximum lag of 2. Standard error bands denote the 95% conﬁdence intervals of the coeﬃcient estimates.
Figure 6: Adjustment Coeﬃcients for 71 Countries, 1970 to 2004: SKMG Approach
















Notes: Estimates of the adjustment coeﬃcients in the panel ARDL model (27) using local kernels in the conditioning variable,
the latter deﬁned as a 10-year predetermined moving average of the NFA to GDP ratio. The lag length is selected according to
the Akaike Information Criterion with a maximum lag of 2. Standard error bands denote the 95% conﬁdence intervals of the
coeﬃcient estimates.
32Figure 7: Long-Run Coeﬃcients for 32 Industrial & Emerging Market Economies, 1970 to
2004: CPMG Approach













Notes: See Figure 3.
Figure 8: Long-Run Coeﬃcients for 32 Industrial & Emerging Market Economies, 1970 to
2004: SKMG Approach













Notes: See Figure 5.
33Figure 9: Long-Run Coeﬃcients for 39 Developing Countries, 1970 to 2004: CPMG
Approach













Notes: See Figure 3.
Figure 10: Long-Run Coeﬃcients for 39 Developing Countries, 1970 to 2004: SKMG
Approach













Notes: See Figure 5.
34Figure 11: Long-Run Coeﬃcients for 50 Sticky Exchange Rate Currencies, 1970 to 2004:
CPMG Approach













Notes: See Figure 3. A country is categorized as following a sticky exchange rate regime if its exchange rate classiﬁcation code
according to the recoded Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) data is on average larger than three over the sample period.
Figure 12: Long-Run Coeﬃcients for 50 Sticky Exchange Rate Currencies, 1970 to 2004:
SKMG Approach













Notes: See Figures 5 and 11.
35Figure 13: Long-Run Coeﬃcients for 21 Floating Exchange Rate Countries, 1970 to 2004:
CPMG Approach













Notes: See Figure 3. A country is categorized as following a ﬂoating exchange rate regime if its exchange rate classiﬁcation
code according to the recoded Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) data is on average not larger than three over the sample
period.
Figure 14: Long-Run Coeﬃcients for 21 Floating Exchange Rate Countries, 1970 to 2004:
SKMG Approach













Notes: See Figures 5 and 13.
36Figure 15: Long-Run Coeﬃcients for 39 Countries with High Degree of Price Variability,
1970 to 2004: CPMG Approach













Notes: See Figure 3. A country is categorized as exhibiting a high degree of price variability if the annual consumer price index
based rate of inﬂation on average exceeds eight percent over the sample period.
Figure 16: Long-Run Coeﬃcients for 39 Countries with High Degree of Price Variability,
1970 to 2004: SKMG Approach













Notes: See Figures 5 and 15.
37Figure 17: Long-Run Coeﬃcients for 32 Countries with Low Degree of Price Variability,
1970 to 2004: CPMG Approach













Notes: See Figure 3. A country is categorized as exhibiting a low degree of price variability if the annual consumer price index
based rate of inﬂation on average does not exceed eight percent over the sample period.
Figure 18: Long-Run Coeﬃcients for 32 Countries with Low Degree of Price Variability,
1970 to 2004: SKMG Approach













Notes: See Figures 5 and 17.
38Figure 19: Projections for the United States
z(0) z(1) z(2)
z −0.28 −0.48 −0.69
θ1 0.72 0.86 0.97
θ2 −0.84 −1.00 −1.11
α −0.50 −0.67 −0.85
(a) Counterfactual States





























(c) Common Factor Eﬀect








(d) Nominal Exchange Rate Changes











(e) Real Exchange Rate Changes
Notes: Sub-ﬁgure (a): Alternative scenarios for the state of the international investment position
and their implications for the long-run coeﬃcients and the speed of adjustment coeﬃcient. Sub-
ﬁgures (b) and (c): Values to the left of the vertical line denote actual observations for domestic
and weighted foreign prices as well as the common factor eﬀects (ˆ χ′
igt); values to the right of the
vertical line represent trend extrapolations for these variables based on 10-year moving averages of
past values. Sub-ﬁgures (d) and (e): The (+)-symbol blue line represents projections based on trend
extrapolations of domestic and weighted foreign prices as well as the common factors conditional on
the 2004 level of the NFA to GDP ratio (z(0)); the (×)-symbol red line represents projections based
on trend extrapolations of the same variables conditional on an NFA to GDP ratio equal to z(1);
the (◦)-symbol green line represents projections based on trend extrapolations of the same variables
conditional on an NFA to GDP ratio equal to z(2).
39Figure 20: Projections for the United Kingdom
z(0) z(1) z(2)
z −0.15 −0.30 −0.45
θ1 0.61 0.73 0.84
θ2 −0.74 −0.86 −0.97
α −0.26 −0.26 −0.27
(a) Counterfactual States



















(c) Common Factor Eﬀect










(d) Nominal Exchange Rate Changes











(e) Real Exchange Rate Changes
Notes: See Figure 19.
40Figure 21: Projections for Spain
z(0) z(1) z(2)
z −0.18 −0.25 −0.33
θ1 0.63 0.70 0.76
θ2 −0.76 −0.82 −0.88
α −0.27 −0.25 −0.23
(a) Counterfactual States


























(c) Common Factor Eﬀect









(d) Nominal Exchange Rate Changes










(e) Real Exchange Rate Changes
Notes: See Figure 19.
41Figure 22: Projections for Mexico
z(0) z(1) z(2)
z −0.44 −0.54 −0.64
θ1 0.83 0.89 0.95
θ2 −0.96 −1.03 −1.09
α −0.60 −0.68 −0.76
(a) Counterfactual States






















(c) Common Factor Eﬀect









(d) Nominal Exchange Rate Changes










(e) Real Exchange Rate Changes
Notes: See Figure 19.
42Figure 23: Projections for Turkey
z(0) z(1) z(2)
z −0.22 −0.29 −0.35
θ1 0.67 0.72 0.77
θ2 −0.80 −0.85 −0.90
α −0.38 −0.40 −0.43
(a) Counterfactual States
























(c) Common Factor Eﬀect










(d) Nominal Exchange Rate Changes










(e) Real Exchange Rate Changes
Notes: See Figure 19.
43Figure 24: Projections for Uruguay
z(0) z(1) z(2)
z −0.23 −0.42 −0.60
θ1 0.68 0.82 0.93
θ2 −0.80 −0.95 −1.07
α −0.49 −0.69 −0.89
(a) Counterfactual States



























(c) Common Factor Eﬀect









(d) Nominal Exchange Rate Changes












(e) Real Exchange Rate Changes
Notes: See Figure 19.
44Figure 25: Projections for India
z(0) z(1) z(2)
z −0.19 −0.15 −0.11
θ1 0.65 0.61 0.57
θ2 −0.77 −0.74 −0.70
α −0.20 −0.21 −0.23
(a) Counterfactual States


























(c) Common Factor Eﬀect









(d) Nominal Exchange Rate Changes









(e) Real Exchange Rate Changes
Notes: See Figure 19.
45Figure 26: Projections for Paraguay
z(0) z(1) z(2)
z −0.55 −0.83 −1.12
θ1 0.90 1.03 1.09
θ2 −1.04 −1.18 −1.26
α −0.37 −0.39 −0.40
(a) Counterfactual States


















(c) Common Factor Eﬀect











(d) Nominal Exchange Rate Changes












(e) Real Exchange Rate Changes
Notes: See Figure 19.
46Figure 27: Projections for Thailand
z(0) z(1) z(2)
z −0.44 −0.41 −0.38
θ1 0.84 0.81 0.79
θ2 −0.97 −0.95 −0.92
α −0.19 −0.18 −0.16
(a) Counterfactual States





















(c) Common Factor Eﬀect












(d) Nominal Exchange Rate Changes










(e) Real Exchange Rate Changes
Notes: See Figure 19.
47Appendices
A Two-Step Estimation of the CPMG Model
In this appendix, we wish to derive the stacked representation in Equation (15). To this
purpose, we rewrite Equation (14) as
∆yi = Ai(˜ zi)yi,−1 + Bi(˜ zi)˜ xi + Ψi(˜ zi)˜ hi + εi (A.1)
= Ai(˜ zi)[yi,−1 + Ai(˜ zi)
−1Bi(˜ zi)˜ xi] + Ψi(˜ zi)˜ hi + εi (A.2)
= Ai(˜ zi)[yi,−1 − Θi(˜ zi)˜ xi] + Ψi(˜ zi)˜ hi + εi, (A.3)
where ˜ xi = (x′
1i x′
2i ... x′







hℓi = (hℓi1 hℓi2 ... hℓiTi)′, ℓ = 1,2,...,n, n = 2p + 1 + m(2q + 1), and the coeﬃcients are
speciﬁed as (block-) diagonal matrices with
Ai(˜ zi) = diag[αi(˜ zi1),αi(˜ zi2),...,αi(˜ ziTi)],
Bi(˜ zi) = [B1i(˜ zi) B2i(˜ zi) ... Bmi(˜ zi)],
Bℓi(˜ zi) = diag[βℓi(˜ zi1),βℓi(˜ zi2),...,βℓi(˜ ziTi)], ℓ = 1,2,...,m,
Ψi(˜ zi) = [Ψ1i(˜ zi) Ψ2i(˜ zi) ... Ψni(˜ zi)],
Ψℓi(˜ zi) = diag[ψℓi(˜ zi1),ψℓi(˜ zi2),...,ψℓi(˜ ziTi)], ℓ = 1,2,...,n,
and
Θi(˜ zi) = −Ai(˜ zi)
−1Bi(˜ zi).
Note that
Θi(˜ zi) = [Θ1i(˜ zi) Θ2i(˜ zi) ... Θmi(˜ zi)],
Θℓi(˜ zi) = diag[θℓi(˜ zi1),θℓi(˜ zi2),...,θℓi(˜ ziTi)], ℓ = 1,2,...,m,
satisfying
θℓi(˜ zit) = −αi(˜ zit)
−1βℓi(˜ zit).
Now, to represent the coeﬃcients using polynomials in the conditioning state variable ˜ zit,
deﬁne the matrix of polynomial elements up to order τ as
Πτ(˜ zi) = [c0(˜ zi) c1(˜ zi) ... cτ(˜ zi)], (A.4)
which has dimension Ti × (τ + 1), given that the columns of Πτ(˜ zi) are constructed as
cs(˜ zi) = [cs(˜ zi1) cs(˜ zi2) ... cs(˜ ziT)]
′, s = 0,1,...,τ.
48The model coeﬃcients are then speciﬁed as follows:
















βℓi(˜ zi) = Πτ(˜ zi)γ
(βℓi)














ψℓi(˜ zi) = Πτ(˜ zi)γ
(ψℓi)














Inserting these polynomial speciﬁcations for the coeﬃcients into the right-hand side terms
of (A.1), we obtain




















X i(˜ zi) = [X 1i(˜ zi) X 2i(˜ zi) ... X mi(˜ zi)],


















In analogous fashion, it holds that




Yi,−1(˜ zi) = diag(yi,−1)Πτ(˜ zi),
and




Hi(˜ zi) = [H1i(˜ zi) H2i(˜ zi) ... Hni(˜ zi)],


















Using Equations (A.8) to (A.10), Equation (A.1) becomes
∆yi = Yi,−1(˜ zi)γ
(αi)
i + X i(˜ zi)γ
(βi)
i + Hi(˜ zi)γ
(ψi)
i + εi. (A.11)
Once the coeﬃcients in (A.11) have been estimated using country-speciﬁc least squares, we
can use these in the second step to obtain the conditionally homogeneous long-run coeﬃcients
through pooled least-squares estimation of
vi = −Θ(˜ zi)˜ xi + ǫi, (A.12)
where
vi = ˆ Ai(˜ zi)
−1
 





ǫi = ˆ Ai(˜ zi)
−1εi,
and




Using a polynomial speciﬁcation for the long-run coeﬃcients, namely
θℓi(˜ zi) = Πτ(˜ zi)γ
(θℓ)




























such that (A.12) ﬁnally becomes
vi = −X i(˜ zi)γ
(θ) + ǫi. (A.15)
B Computation of Smoothed Mean Group Estimates
and Standard Errors for Speed of Adjustment Co-
eﬃcients
Under the CPMG approach, we estimate N separate functional forms for the speed of ad-
justment coeﬃcients, such that
ˆ α
(j)
it = ˆ αj(˜ zit), i = 1,2,...,N, t = 1,2,...,Ti, j = 1,2,...,N, (B.1)
50represents the estimate of the speed of adjustment evaluated at observation (i,t) using the
functional form estimated for country j. Similar to the MG approach we now want to obtain
an estimate of the mean relationship in the panel between the speed of adjustment coeﬃcient
and the conditioning state variable ˜ zit by averaging across country-speciﬁc estimates of this
relationship. The country-speciﬁc functional forms are based on Chebyshev polynomials up
to order r, with polynomial terms cs(˜ zit) and parameters γ
(αj)
js , s = 0,1,...,r. The mean
coeﬃcient at the point ˜ zit should therefore be an average of the coeﬃcients implied by
each polynomial. However, the polynomial function for each country’s speed of adjustment
coeﬃcient is estimated on the basis of the observations for that country only and therefore
might only be valid in a limited range of values for ˜ zit. Extrapolating this function to values
that are far from this range might lead to large outliers which can distort the panel MG
coeﬃcient.
We therefore compute a weighted average of the heterogeneous coeﬃcients ˆ αj(˜ zit), where the
weights decrease with the distance of ˜ zit from the mean for country j, ¯ zj. The distance may
be incorporated using a kernel speciﬁcation. In particular, let ˆ γ
(αj)
j be the r + 1 vector of
estimated polynomial coeﬃcients for country j. Then
ˆ α
(j)










˜ zit − ¯ zj
h
),
where K( ) denotes the Gaussian kernel and h the bandwidth, computed following Pagan and
Ullah (1999, p. 26) as h = 1.06σ˜ z(
 N
i=1 Ti)−1/5, with σ˜ z representing the overall standard











We ﬁnally are in a position to construct a smoothed mean group estimator (SMG) of the



































, where K( ) denotes a standard kernel function
such as the Gaussian kernel and h an appropriate choice of bandwidth. Then for a given
combination of cross-sectional reference point j and time-series reference point s the kernel









κ(˜ zi1 − ˜ zjs) 0
κ(˜ zi2 − ˜ zjs)
...










where for notational convenience the superscript (h) has been dropped, as in Section 3.3.


























It is clear that the estimation results will be aﬀected by the choice of both the kernel density
function, K( ), and the bandwidth parameter, h. Nevertheless, the speciﬁc kernel function is
not crucial for the estimation results as for kernels belonging to the same class, the bandwidth
parameter can be adjusted using “canonical kernels” such that the estimated functions are
largely equivalent.22 Employing the Gaussian kernel, we follow Pagan and Ullah (1999, p. 26)
and choose the bandwidth parameter as





where σ˜ z is the standard deviation of the conditioning variable ˜ zit across time and cross
sections.
D Testing for the Existence of a Long-Run Relation-
ship
To compute the MG, PMG, CPMG and SKMG estimators, we need to be assured that a
long-run relation between the dependent variable, y, and the regressors, x, in the panel
22See, for example, H¨ ardle (1990).
52ARDL model exists (unconditionally so for MG and PMG, and conditionally for CPMG and
SKMG). Presuming that y and x are integrated of order one, I(1), one may test whether
they are cointegrated by considering a least squares regression of the form
yit = ̟i + θ(˜ zit)
′xit + ξit, (D.1)
and examining whether the error term ξit in this regression is I(0) or I(1). If the null
hypothesis is formulated as there being no cointegrating relation between yit and xit, then
the error term ξit should be I(1). We employ the panel cointegration test proposed by
Westerlund (2005) which implements this idea in a non-parametric format, not relying on
speciﬁc assumptions regarding the data-generating processes for yit and xit. This makes the
test applicable both when the conditioning function θ(˜ z) collapses to a constant and when
it exhibits variation across diﬀerent values of ˜ z. All that is required is that θ(˜ z)′x contains
only I(0) and I(1) regressors.
The test also allows for cross-section dependence in the error term, ξit, via common eﬀects. To
test the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative hypothesis of cointegration














where ˆ vit =
 t
s=1 ˆ ξis and ˆ ui =
 T
t=1 ˆ ξ2
it. This test statistic is distributed standard Normal
under the null hypothesis of no cointegration after appropriate mean and variance corrections
as reported by Westerlund (2005).
E Valuation Adjustment
In the compilation of our database we followed the principles for valuation adjustment de-
scribed in Appendix A of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001). In particular, equity assets (value
of domestic holdings of foreign equity shares in U.S. Dollars) were adjusted by changes in
the MSCI World Index, m, assuming that equity investment abroad is allocated according
to the world portfolio that is approximated by this index.23 Decomposing the change in the
stock into
∆EQAit = DEQAit + ∆V (EQA)it, (E.1)
where DEQAit refers to the ﬂow of equity assets from country i in period t, we computed















23Note that for the United States, Japan and the UK we used an adjusted index that in each case excluded
these countries from the deﬁnition of the rest of the world.
53taking into account that mt refers to end-of-period values, whereas ﬂows are assumed to
occur uniformly throughout the year and thus at an average value of
√
mtmt−1.
Equity liabilities (value of foreign holdings of domestic equity shares in U.S. Dollars) were
adjusted by U.S. Dollar based changes in domestic (or regional) stock market indices, mi, in
the same vein as equity assets, with
∆EQLit = DEQLit + ∆V (EQL)it, (E.3)














FDI assets on the basis of the book value method were adjusted for changes in the real
(trade-weighted) U.S. Dollar exchange rate of country i’s trade partners as follows:
∆FDIAit = DFDIAit + ∆V (FDIA)it, (E.5)
where DFDIAit denotes the ﬂow of FDI assets from country i in period t and ∆V (FDIA)it
the change in the value of country i’s FDI asset stock from the end of period t − 1 to the




















CPI denoting the consumer price index and sjt country j’s nominal bilateral exchange rate
with the U.S. Dollar in units of domestic currency per one U.S. Dollar. The weight wijt is
calculated as country i’s trade (the sum of exports, EXP, and imports, IMP) with country




k=1 EXPikt + IMPikt
. (E.8)
We thus assume that the foreign direct investment ﬂows from a country are in line with its
trade pattern, and that changes in the foreign direct investment position that country i holds
in country j are due to changes in the relative price of consumption goods between country
j and the United States as well as changes in the value of country j’s currency relative to
the U.S. Dollar.
FDI liabilities were adjusted using analogous formulae, namely:
∆FDILit = DFDILi,t−1 + ∆V (FDIL)it (E.9)
54where DFDILit denotes the ﬂow of FDI liabilities to country i in period t and the change











CPIUS,t   sit
. (E.11)
Finally, we inferred changes to the stock of international reserves excluding gold holdings
(RES∗) from the diﬀerence between the change in oﬃcial reserves (∆RES) according to IIP
and recorded reserve ﬂows (DRES):
∆V (RES
∗)it = ∆RESit − DRESit. (E.12)
Consequently, the net valuation change used for adjusting the cumulative ﬂow measure for
NFA (taking into account once more that changes in the value of external debt are already
incorporated in the stock values reported in the GDF database) was constructed as
∆NVit = ∆V (FDIA)it−∆V (FDIL)it+∆V (EQA)it−∆V (EQL)it+∆V (RES
∗)it. (E.13)
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